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INTROdUCTION
Comparatively, South Africa has chosen to operate its local government on an extremely 
large scale. It has gone for larger municipalities for two main reasons. Firstly, there is the 
belief that smaller municipalities are inefficient and not financially viable. Secondly, it 
combined richer white areas with poor black townships in order to create the conditions for 
the equitable redistribution of services and resources from richer white areas to poorer black 
areas (Cameron 2006).
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AbSTRACT
The objectives of this article are to locate the size of South Africa’s metropolitan 
and local municipalities within an international context; to examine whether local 
government size has been a factor affecting the performance of local governments 
and to analyse how South Africa has situated itself within the efficiency–local 
democracy debate. A number of indicators were used in respect of the different 
population and geographical sizes of municipalities. The Municipal Demarcation 
Board created a number of metropolitan and local municipalities which were 
bigger than its own guidelines. A major reason for this was the belief that larger 
municipalities are more efficient, promote financial viability and can promote 
equity. The findings were that larger municipalities do perform better than smaller 
municipalities, but this is not a consistent trend. There is some evidence that bigger 
municipalities have led to remoteness. The available evidence suggests that the 
creation of larger municipalities has not necessarily led to greater efficiency nor 
has it promoted local democracy.
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However for the political function to be exercised properly there must be sufficient 
numbers of qualified elected politicians available to do so, and for them to be able to be 
sufficiently close to and in touch with their electorates to know their needs, views and 
preferences. Logically, there must come a point when local governments become so big and 
the ratio of electors to their representatives so large that it becomes difficult for these basic 
democratic conditions to be met.
This article sets out to test this proposition. Its objectives are:
●● to locate the size of South Africa’s metropolitan and local municipalities within an 
international context;
●● to examine whether local government size has been a factor affecting the performance 
of local governments;
●● to analyse how South Africa has situated itself within the efficiency–local democracy 
debate;
It focuses primarily on population size but also considers to a lesser extent geographical size.
METhOdOlOgy
The research methodology consisted of:
●● The perusal of existing data bases on local government. This enabled researchers to 
develop a number of indicators in respect of the different population and geographical 
sizes of municipalities and they were able to draw certain preliminary conclusions;
●● An analysis of comparative material on the size of local government;
●● A desktop analysis of relevant South African documentation.
●● Semi-structured interviews with South African local government stakeholders.
●● There are limitations to this research–it is still work in progress. More systematic 
empirical research is needed to test this relationship between size, democracy and 
efficiency.
REvIEw OF lITERATURE ON ThE SIzES OF MUNICIPAlITIES
Efficiency vs Democracy
There is often held to be a trade-off between efficiency and democracy. As Leemans (1970) 
in his classical work points out, if emphasis is placed on local democracy and large scale this 
results in the preference for fairly small local governments. If however emphasis is placed on 
efficiency, financial strength and social and economic development, the preference tends to 
be for larger units of local government.
Efficiency and Economies of scale
Partly because of the apparent inconclusiveness of the research evidence, there is much 
controversy about the optimal size of local government areas – in terms of both population 
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and territory. Arguments related to efficiencies of scale are used to support both large- and 
small-scale jurisdictions. Advocates of larger jurisdictions often propose a threshold of a 
minimum size, on the grounds that jurisdictions below the threshold size would either have 
insufficient resources to pay for the service, or too few citizens to use it. Jurisdictions smaller 
than the threshold are unable to attain economies of scale. The minimum jurisdiction size 
might be measured by population, tax base, or workload (Paddison 1983, Smith 1993, Smith 
1985, Keating 1995).
The bigger is better thesis has underpinned mergers and consolidations of local 
governments in both developed and developing countries in almost all parts of the 
world: Europe, South East Asia, Australasia, and Africa. Many countries have undertaken 
amalgamation of municipalities. Research, however, is far from conclusive on there being a 
positive correlation between authority size and service performance – or at least on there 
being a single, linear one – and there are also concerns about diseconomies of scale in 
very large units. However, there is little conclusive evidence on what either the minimum 
or the optimal size should be. Larger local authorities may well become inefficient, but it is 
difficult to establish, even for individual services, the size at which they do so (Smith 1985, 
Keating 1995).
Public choice theorists would disagree with the whole thrust of economies of scale 
arguments, and would counter with the case for the efficiencies of fragmented local 
government. Citizens have diverse preferences for public goods and services, and a 
multiplicity of jurisdictions will operate more efficiently and effectively than an area-wide 
body. Smaller local governments are likely to provide a more diverse range of services and 
programmes – giving people and businesses alike the chance to vote with their feet (Keating 
1995, Ross, Levine and Stedman (2001).
size and local Democracy
Most of the studies on local government size focus heavily, if not exclusively on the service-
providing responsibilities of local authorities. But what distinguishes elected local authorities 
from other institutions even more than their multi-service providing function is their role as 
representative and accountable institutions of local self-government. This function seems as 
likely to be affected by scale, as is efficiency or economy of service provision – though in 
this case inversely, it might be supposed. Local authorities need to be local enough for every 
citizen to be able to identify with. Larger units, particularly in metropolitan areas, would 
seem to risk becoming remote from their residents, service users and electorates, thereby 
becoming less responsive to their needs and demands.
The amalgamation of small authorities has been rejected by the politicians and people of 
several large European countries, in favour of the Voluntary Partnership route (see Table 1). 
There has been an effective insistence that significantly larger and, at least initially, artificial 
units of local government would lead to a psychological as well as a physical distancing and 
a likely diminution in participation.
A counter-argument to this is that of Ehrenhalt (1995:9) who suggests that, while smaller 
local governments may be geographically close to citizens, if they are essentially invisible 
– in the sense of being too small to provide basic services – the benefits of small units are 
meaningless. Newton too, though deploying rather different arguments (1982:91) challenged 
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the notion that small is beautiful and concluded that the democratic merits of smaller units 
have been exaggerated and romanticised, while their democratic deficiencies have been 
overlooked. Conversely, larger units do not seem deficient in democratic qualities and may 
even be more democratic in some respects. Democracy is better promoted in large local 
municipalities who have greater functional capacity to promote civic involvement and public 
participation.
Here, then, is another subject area where assertion is much easier than proof, and what 
research there has been is again far from conclusive. As Ehrenhalt’s contribution emphasizes, 
considerable care is needed in drawing conclusions from studies that may be comparing 
different phenomena in institutions and local government systems of very different sizes.
Bearing such qualifications in mind, there is some evidence of an inverse correlation 
between local authority size and certain democratic behaviours: local electoral turnout, 
direct citizen contact with councillors and local authority officials, citizen attendance at 
council meetings, and other forms of political engagement (e.g. Oliver 2000, Denters 2002, 
Ladner 2002, Kelleher and Lowery 2004, Copus 2006). Other researchers, though, have 
found that, as with service efficiency, some forms of citizen involvement appear to increase 
as local authority size increases – up to a point, after which it begins to decline (e.g. Keating 
1995, Rose 2002, Frandsen 2002).
Comparative Data – How south Africa Compare
This article now examines some of the comparative material on local government size and 
analyses how South Africa performs in relation to other countries.
Several European countries have only one significant level or tier of local government, 
but these are mainly the smaller and, apart from Finland do not appear in Table 1. The larger 
countries, with one partial exception, all have two- or three-tier systems, and the figures in 
the central column are for the most local tier only. In Europe, where first-tier often refers to 
the least local tier, the authorities in the table might be termed second or third tier, but these 
terms are avoided here, in order to prevent any confusion. The countries in the table are 
listed according to the average population of these most local local authorities.
If South Africa were to appear in Table 1, its number of most local municipalities would 
be 234 – 8 metropolitan + 226 local municipalities. To combine, however, these two entirely 
different types of authority for the sake of comparison would be distorting so the statistic 
is not used seriously in this report. However, for the record, the population average to be 
compared to those in Table 1 would be 221 000 (see Table 3). The European averages vary 
considerably, but the EU27 average is 5 630 – and, excluding France as a maverick outlier, 
around 8,000 (Table 3).
In South Africa, if the metropolitan municipalities were to be excluded and only the 
approximately 32 million residents of local municipalities included, the average population 
falls dramatically to about 139 000 – extremely high by comparison with all European 
countries, apart from the United Kingdom (UK).
In area, South Africa is well over twice the size of the largest of the Western European 
countries in Table 1, and it might be supposed that this measure of scale accounts at least 
in part for the great differences in the population sizes of their respective municipalities. 
Table 2, therefore, illustrates some of the non-European OECD countries, ranging from the 
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geographically large and sparsely populated to the small and densely populated. The countries 
vary greatly too in the functional and financial importance of their local government sectors, 
as measured, for example, by their local authorities’ share of total government spending – an 
obviously vital consideration in all of these statistical comparisons.
This basic observation is further confirmed in Table 3, the last of these comparative tables, 
for the larger African countries. This table is deliberately set out in more detail than the 
others are, because some of the comparative municipality figures may be open to question. 
There are two related problems. The first is that, on virtually all decentralisation measures – 
political, administrative, fiscal – South Africa scores higher, and in many cases much higher, 
than just about all other African countries (Ndegwa 2002).
Comparison of South Africa’s local government arrangements with those of almost all 
other African countries is unlikely to be a comparison of like with like. The second difficulty 
is to determine, if any comparison is to be attempted, which tier of local government in these 
generally weak governmental systems is the principal, and therefore the most appropriate, 
one to select.
Questionable as some of these comparisons may be, the table does seem to reinforce the 
impression that South Africa’s priorities in structuring and restructuring its local government 
arrangements have resembled those of successive British governments in their drive towards 























OECD Countries – a selection of OECD countries outside Western Europe
Turkey 73 784 93 2+ 923 ilçeler 79,000 849
Czech Republic 10 79 133 2 6,249 obec 1,700 13
Hungary 10 93 108 2 3,175 települések 3,160 29
Poland 38 313 122 2 2,478 gminy 15,000 126









Japan 127 378 337 2+ 1,788 shicho-sonku 71,000 211
Repub. Of Korea 48 100 487 2 232 counties etc. 207,000 435
Australia 22 7,682 3 2 564 local gov’ts 39,000 13,620
Mexico 108 1,958 55 2 2,411 municipios 45,000 812
Chile 17 756 23 3 346 comunas 49,000 2,184
sources: CEMR-Dexia, 2009, individual countries’ publications, Cameron and Game, 2010.
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more unitary and larger scale local government. They appear to have favoured the service 
function of local government, rather than the political function.
lOCAl gOvERNMENT REORgANISATION IN SOUTh AFRICA
Constitutional framework
The new constitutional framework vested local government with a great deal of 
decentralisation. South Africa historically had a centralist form of government with provincial 
governments controlling the scope of local government through provincial ordinances which 
defined their functions and powers. Local government legislation also had to be approved 
by provinces. This changed quite substantially under the final system of local government. 
Theoretically, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 uplifted local government 
from a subordinate level of government to a significant sphere in its own right. Provision was 
no longer made for levels of government, but rather there is now a three-sphere system of 
government in which the spheres are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated with the 
principle of co-operative governance underpinning intergovernmental relations (Pimstone 
1998, Cameron 1999).
Municipal Demarcation Board
The Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, 27 of 1998 created a single Municipal 
Demarcation Board (MDB) in South Africa. The MDB was the final decision-making body 
when it comes to the demarcation of boundaries.
The MDB rationalised municipalities from 843 to 284 in 2000. They were further reduced 
to 283 in 2006 and then 278 in 2011. The municipalities consist of:
●● Metropolitan municipalities: 8
●● District Municipalities: 44
●● Local Municipalities: 226
Performance of Municipalities: Post 2000
There is general consensus that the South African local government system, despite pockets 
of excellence is not working. A Department of Co-operative Governance (COG) report 
(2009) stated that local government is in distress. Amongst the reasons for this are:
●● huge service delivery and backlog challenges, e.g. housing, water and sanitation;
●● poor communication and accountability relationships with communities;
●● problems with the political administrative interface;
●● corruption and fraud;
●● poor financial management, e.g. negative audit opinions;
●● number of (violent) service delivery protests;
●● weak civil society formations;
●● intra–and inter-political party issues negatively affecting governance and delivery; and
●● insufficient municipal capacity due to lack of scarce skills.
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The COG report also pointed to the break-down of local democracy which included 
community alienation, break-down in social compact, community protests, break-down in 
trust between government and the people, weak community participation through ward 
committees and unresponsive government.
To what extent have wide boundaries contributed to poor performance and the break-
down of local democracy? There have been some studies that suggest that the large size 
of municipalities are dysfunctional which have led to both poor performance and local 
democracy. Some local municipalities complained that their areas of jurisdiction were too 
big to service properly and to promote public participation, which is a statutory obligation. 
Many municipal managers state that their municipalities were stretched financially and 
administratively in delivering services to the vast rural areas that were now part of urban 
municipalities. (Atkinson 2003, Cameron 2003, South African Institute of International 
Relations 2012).
There have been a number of protests against boundary amalgamation down the years. 
More recently in 2013 there were violent protests in Metsimaholo municipality against the 
MDB’s proposal to amalgamate the municipality with a neighbouring local government.
However none of these studies has used systematic empirical data. The next section 
considers some of the data bases on local government in order to analyse this issue of 
size. It investigates metropolitan and local government only because they, unlike district 
municipalities, are the most local tier of local government.
METROPOlITAN gOvERNMENT bOUNdARIES
The MDB had to take into account Section 2 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures 
Act, 117 of 1998 when determining metropolitan boundaries in 2000. Section 2 states that:
An area which must have Category A municipalities is:
●● a conurbation featuring :-
●● areas of high population density:
●● an intensive movement of people, goods, and services;
●● extensive development; and
●● multiple business districts and industrial areas;
●● a centre of economic activity with a complex and diverse economy;
●● single area for which integrated development is desirable; and
●● having strong interdependent social and economic linkages between its constituent 
units.
This definition is a description of metropolitan areas, which means that category A 
municipalities can be introduced in such areas only.
In practice there was a heavy emphasis on commuting which had two distinct 
components. Firstly, the MDB argued that the best means of determining the socio-economic 
interdependence of people, communities and economies was through commuting patterns. 
This was because commuting is probably the best single measure of the relationship between 
human settlements on the one hand, and employment spending and amenity usage patterns 
on the other. Secondly, the application of the Group Areas Act, and homelands development 
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strategies resulted in an attenuated settlement pattern in and around metropolitan areas most 
notably the relocation of poor communities to the fringes of the metropolitan areas. It was 
of the view that a metropolitan or local council should encompass at least 50% of all people 
who live, work and shop within that area. However the Board did state that these factors 
have to be balanced by other criteria such as administrative capacity and financial viability 
(Municipal Demarcation Board 1999a, Cameron 2006).
The Board created six single-tier metropolitan authorities in the country:
●● Greater Johannesburg
●● Greater Durban (now called eThekwini)
●● Greater Cape Town
●● Greater Pretoria (now called Tshwane)
●● East Rand (now called Ekurhuleni)
●● Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage-Despatch (now called Nelson Mandela Bay).
Two new metros were created in 2011, namely, Buffalo City and Mangaung.
ANAlySIS OF METROPOlITAN MUNICIPAlITIES dATA
In this section an analysis of data on metropolitan government is undertaken.





% increase since 
2011
Buffalo City 704 855 755 200 50 345 7,14
Cape Town 2 892 240 3 740 030 847790 29,31
Ekurhuleni Metro 2 481 760 3 178 470 696 710 28,07
eThekwini 3 090 120 3 442 360 352 240 11,40
City of Johannesburg 3 226 060 4 434 830 1 208 770 37,47
Mangaung 645 440 747 431 101 991 15,80
Nelson Mandela Bay 1 005 780 1 152 120 146 340 14,55
City of Tshwane 2 142 320 2 921 490 779 170 36,37
Average 2 023 572 2 546 491 522 920 22,51
source: Stats SA, 2001, 2011
The average population size of metros is 2 546 491. It can be seen that there is a hierarchy 
among the metros. Johannesburg, Cape Town, eThekwini and Ekurhuleni all have population 
of three million and above while Tshwane has a population of just under three million. 
Nelson Mandela Bay has a population of just over a million while the new metros, Buffalo 
City and Mangaung have populations around 750 000.
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table 5 Metropolitan Municipalities: Geographical Size
Municipality geographical size km2
Buffalo City 2 536
Cape Town 2 445
Ekurhuleni Metro 1 975
eThekwini 2 291
City of Johannesburg 1 645
Mangaung 6 284
Nelson Mandela Bay 1 959
City of Tshwane 6 298
Average 3 179
source: National Treasury Local Government Database, 2013
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Volume 6 number 4 • December 2013 13
Johannesburg, Cape Town, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni have also shown growth rates over 
25%. All the other metros show growth rates between 7,14% and 15,80%.
The geographical size of Tshwane and Mangaung is over 6000 per km2. This is because of 
the large swathes of rural areas in these metros. A number of the densely populated metros 
such as Cape Town and Johannesburg have a much lower geographical size per km2.
The article now examines levels of performance. None of the metros received financially 
unqualified audits with no findings. Four metros received financially unqualified audits with 
findings and Ekurhuleni received a qualified audit. The two smallest metros received poor 
performance ratings with Mangaung getting a disclaimer and Buffalo City an adverse rating.
The next indicator is financial stress which was an indicator developed by the Treasury to 
assess the financial state of municipalities. Mangaung, which has the smallest population of 
all the metros, is the only metro to be judged as being financially stressed.
This section considers the indicators that define local democracy. In the comparative 
section it had already been pointed out that South Africa has gone for extremely large 
municipalities prioritising efficiency and equity over local democracy. A good indicator 
of local democracy is voter turnout. The comparative section stated that there is often an 
inverse relationship between voter turnout and population size.
The national turnout for the 2011 local government elections was 57,64%. The metro 
average of 58,31% compares favourably to this. However this needs to be disaggregated. 
Arguably Cape Town and Nelson Mandela Bay were outliers. These were the two metros 
that were the most closely contested with the opposition Democratic Alliance winning Cape 
Town and narrowly losing Nelson Mandela Bay. The other 6 metros are dominated by the 
African National Congress.
If one excludes the Cape Town and Nelson Mandela Bay figures the average is 56,2% 
which is below the national norm.







City of Johannesburg No
Mangaung Yes
Nelson Mandela Bay No
City of Tshwane No
Average No
source: National Treasury, 2012
table 8  Metropolitan Municipalities 
Voter Turnout





City of Johannesburg 54,94%
Mangaung 54,81%
Nelson Mandela Bay 64,65%
City of Tshwane 55,32%
Average 58,31%
source: Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) 2011
African Journal of Public Affairs14
summary of Metropolitan Municipalities
The data shows that there is a great deal of variation between the sizes of metros. There are 
three big metros (Johannesburg, Cape Town and eThekwini), two reasonably big metros 
(Tshwane and Ekurhuleni) and three metros that are considerably smaller than all of the other 
metros (Nelson Mandela Bay, Buffalo City, Mangaung ). In terms of performance indicators 
the bigger metros perform better than smaller metros. The turnout in metros if one excludes 
Cape Town and Nelson Mandela Bay is slightly below the national norm.
lOCAl MUNICIPAlITIES
When it came to the demarcation of local municipalities, the MDB decided on the following 
principles, based on Sections 24 and 25 of the Demarcation Act, 1998.
●● Geographical contiguity and coherence: Because municipal government is so closely 
tied to local identity and accessibility to local representatives, rationalisation should 
generally follow nearest neighbour principles–that is, there should be geographically 
coherent consolidated local municipalities, and not leapfrog amalgamation of areas.
●● Capacity Development: Another objective of rationalisation was to develop a critical 
mass of municipal capacity (staff, assets, finances) especially where under-capacitated 
municipalities existed.
●● Resource Sharing: Wherever possible existing municipalities and/or other areas should 
be combined with a view to realising fiscally sustainable units, with weaker areas 
being paired with stronger areas so as to achieve a sharing of existing or potential 
resources.
●● Manageable Size: A statistical-derived indicator of 3 500 km2 and 80 000 persons 
was suggested as the probable norm for Category B municipalities. However, 
deviations from the norm were inevitable, given the uneven geographical distribution 
of population and economic activity throughout the country. The MDB’s empirical 
research suggested that populations of less than 20 000 are generally undesirable 
for Category B municipalities given the objectives of realising economies of scale in 
municipalities. Given the need for geographical coherence and local identity, areas 
greater than 10 000 square kilometres were also desirable.
●● Functionality: Amalgamation of places with internal linkages was an important 
consideration when determining Category B boundaries. (Municipal Demarcation 
Board 1999b, Cameron 2006).
There are a number of pointers around size in these indicators. For example, combining richer 
and poorer areas and capacity thresholds suggest larger rather than smaller municipalities. 
Even more specific is the reference to both population and geographical size guidelines. To 
what extent did the Board conform to these guidelines?
It can be deduced that 73% of local municipalities falls in the 20 001 to 200 000 
population range. The Board suggested that populations of less than 20,000 are generally 
undesirable for local municipalities given the objectives of realising economies of scale in 
municipalities. In fact 7,1% of municipalities have populations of fewer than the 20 000 
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minimum recommended by the MDB. The MDB suggested that the population norm for 
local municipalities should be 80 000. While there is no category up to 80 000, there are 
111 municipalities which have a population of 100 001 upwards, well above the Board norm. 
Of the local municipalities 9,7% have populations of over 300 001.
The geographical size of municipalities is large. The MDB recommended that the norm 
for local municipalities should be 3500 km2. What then does the data tell us? While there is 
no category up to 3 500 km, 31,85% of local municipalities are larger than 5001 km2. 7,52% 
of local municipalities have a geographical size of less than 1000 km2. The MDB also stated 
that under some circumstances areas greater than 10 000 km2 were also desirable. 12,38% 
of the municipalities have areas greater than 10 001 km2.
table 9  Local Municipalities: Size Per Population Range
Population size 2011 number of local Municipalities Percentage local Municipalities
Under 20 000 16 7,08
20 001–50 000 39 17,26
50 001–100 000 60 26,55
100 001–200 000 66 29,20
200 001–300 000 23 10,18
300 001–400 000 11 4,87
400 001–500 000 3 1,33
500 001–850 000 8 3,54
source: Stats SA, 2011
table 10: Local Municipalities: Per Geographical Size Km2
geographical size km2 2011 number of local Municipalities Percentage local Municipalities
1–1 000 17 7,52
1 001–3 000 74 32,74
3 001–5 000 63 27,88
5 001–7 000 25 11,06
7 001–10 000 19 8,41
10 001–15 000 13 5,75
15 001–20 000 6 2,65
20 001 + 9 3,98
source: Stats SA, 2011
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There is a general poor audit performance across all the population ranges. There are six 
financially unqualified audits without findings of which five are in the 50 001 to 100 000 
population range. This is however only 18,3% of all the local municipalities in this population 
range. All the population ranges have a number of municipalities which have received 
qualified audits and disclaimers. One possible trend is that it is largely the smaller population 
ranges which have outstanding audits. This suggests that smaller municipalities lack financial 
capacity to manage their municipalities efficiently.
The largest number of local municipalities in financial stress is in the under 20 000 
category with 56,25%. This confirms the MDB’s view that smaller municipalities with 
populations less than 20 000 are not viable. There is a steady decline in the number of 
local municipalities in financial distress in the larger population ranges with the exception 
table 12 Local Municipality Financial Distress Per Population Range
Population size 2011







Under 20 000 16 7,14 56,25
20 001–50 000 38* 16,96 42,11
50 001–100 000 60 26,79 40,00
100 001–200 000 65* 29,02 30,77
200 001–300 000 23 10,27 21,74
300 001–400 000 11 4,91 27,27
400 001–500 000 3 1,34 100,00
500 001–850 000 8 3,57 37,50
*There are local municipalities where the Auditor-General’s report was not available
source: National Treasury, 2012
table 13  Local Municipalities Voter Turnout Per Population Range
Population size 2011




2011 Average Voter 
turnout
Under 20 000 16 7,08 69,58%
20 001–50 000 39 17,26 62,41%
50 001–100 000 60 26,55 60,40%
100 001–200 000 66 29,2 58,48%
200 001–300 000 23 10,18 56,54%
300 001–400 000 11 4,87 55,49%
400 001–500 000 3 1,33 51,84%
500 001–850 000 8 3,54 52,13%
source: IEC, 2011
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of the 400 001 to 500 000 category where all three municipalities in this category are in 
financial distress.
The argument has been made that larger local municipalities are more likely to be remote 
from citizens which will discourage interest in local government. What then does the data on 
turnout per population range prove? The national turnout for local government elections is 
57,64%. The turnout for local municipality elections only is higher at 59,86%.
The data, however, suggests that South African voters are more likely to turn-out to vote 
in smaller local municipalities (less than 100 000) which have higher turn-outs than both the 
national and local municipalities’ average. The 100 001 to 200 000 turn-out of 58,48% is 
higher than the national average but lower than the local municipalities’ average. However, 
municipalities which have populations above 200 001 have a lower turn-out than both the 
national government and local municipalities’ average.
SUMMARy OF lOCAl MUNICIPAlITIES
The MDB has created extremely large municipalities in respect of both population size 
and geographical norms which are much bigger than its own recommended guidelines for 
boundaries. If performance indicators are considered, bigger municipalities generally perform 
better than smaller municipalities in respect of both audit reports and financial management. 
This is not, however, a consistent trend in that some larger municipalities also perform badly 
on both of these indicators. There is better turn-out in smaller local municipalities which 
suggests that there is more citizen interest in smaller jurisdictions.
CONClUSION
Comparatively, South Africa has created extremely large municipalities in terms of population 
size. Its municipalities are considerably larger than in all the European countries, with the 
possible exception of the UK, and are larger than most of the other OECD and African 
countries.
The MDB created a number of local and metropolitan municipalities which were bigger 
than its own guidelines. A major reason for this was the belief that larger municipalities are 
more efficient, promote financial viability and can promote equity. Bigger municipalities do 
perform better than smaller municipalities but this is not a consistent trend. There are metros 
and large local municiplaities that do not perform well.
The ability of local councillors to represent their electors which have large population 
sizes and/or large geographical areas is limited. There is some evidence that these large 
municipalities have led to remoteness in that there are lower turn-outs in larger municipalities. 
While the empirical data is still limited, there is other evidence to suggest that these large 
municipalities have not promoted local democracy. Interviews with municipal managers 
suggest that it was difficult to promote public participation in larger jurisdictions. There have 
been service protests against amalgamations. The COG report of 2009 also implied that 
larger municipalities were leading to citizen alienation. Notwithstanding this, more work 
needs to be done on developing indicators that promote local democracy.
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Where then does South Africa stand in this efficiency- democracy debate? The MDB 
has come down on the side of efficiency at the expense of local democracy. However the 
available evidence indicates that the creation of larger municipalities has not necessarily led 
to greater efficiency nor has is it promoted local democracy.
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